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THE WTI INCINERATOR: THE RCRA CITIZEN
SUIT AND THE EMERGENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
HALLIE L. SHIPLEY†
ABSTRACT
The WTI Incinerator currently operates in East Liverpool, Ohio, burning toxic
waste despite a district court ruling that held it posed an imminent and substantial
risk to both human health and the environment. Unfortunately for the Ohio
plaintiffs, the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case misinterpreted the RCRA Citizen
suit provision, barring any remedy for the Ohio citizens who brought the suit. This
flawed interpretation has been adopted nationwide by other Appellate Circuit
Courts.
This article compares the remedies available to U.S. citizens for environmental
harms with those remedies available to the citizens under the European Union Court
of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, using the WTI Incinerator as a case study. This article argues that
Congress needs to rewrite the RCRA citizen suit provision to allow for the remedies
it originally intended to allow U.S. citizens the same redresses against
environmental harms enjoyed by those citizens in other international jurisdictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2009, residents of East Liverpool, Ohio, looked out their windows to
see a pink plume on the horizon.1 The plume was the result of iodine released from
the stacks of the Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) hazardous waste incinerator. 2
A power outage at the plant caused suppression sprayers, which normally alter the
chemical to remove the pink color, to fail.3 While the Ohio and United States
Environmental Protection Agencies held a meeting to assure the public that they
were not in any danger, citizens were not convinced. 4 Perhaps their skepticism
stemmed from the numerous safety and legal issues that have plagued WTI since it
began operations in 1993.5
WTI sits 320 feet from the nearest residence and 1,100 feet from an elementary
school.6 The school is at the same elevation as the top of the emissions stack. 7 The
1
Jo Ann Bobby-Gilbert, Pink Plume Was Iodine, Nothing Hazardous, THE REVIEW (East
Liverpool), (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.reviewonline.com/page/content.detail/id/ 521231.
html? nav=5008.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

See Enforcement and Compliance History Online Detail Facility Report for WTI, EPAECHO.GOV (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.epa-echo.gov/cgi-bin/get1cReport.cgi?tool=echo&ID
Number=110027242320; Michael D. McElwain, Ohio EPA: Heritage-WTI in Violation of
Permit, THE REVIEW (East Liverpool) (June 26, 2010), http://www.reviewonline.com/page/
content.detail/id/528255.html?nav=5008.
6
Ashley Schannauer, Issues in Environmental Law: The WTI Risks Assessments: The
Need for Effective Public Participation, 24 VT. L. REV. 31, 34 (1999) [hereinafter Schannauer,
WTI Risk Assessments].
7

Id. at 34.
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facility burns approximately 60,000 pounds of hazardous waste a year. 8 The school
has an emergency response plan in the event of an accident at the WTI facility; it
involves duct tape.9 WTI is located on the bank of the Ohio River at the point where
Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania meet 10 and has been the target of both health
and environmental groups attempting to stop the facility from operating. 11 These
groups have used a variety of methods in their fight to get WTI shut down, including
social protests and seeking legal injunctions. 12
In the United States (U.S.), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) controls the regulation of hazardous waste. 13 RCRA includes a provision
which allows citizens to bring suit against a facility that poses an imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health or the environment. 14 However, as this
article will discuss, because of the way courts have interpreted the RCRA citizen suit
provision, citizens are often unsuccessful in these suits when challenging a facility
that has been granted a RCRA permit to operate by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA). Courts often interpret challenges as collateral attacks
of a final agency decision, namely the final decision of the USEPA to grant a facility
a permit.15 This interpretation fails to consider that USEPA permit decisions do not
address a facility‟s possible impact on human health or the environment, which is the
main focus of a RCRA citizen suit. 16 Additionally, courts fail to consider that

8

THOMAS SHEVORY, TOXIC BURN: THE GRASSROOTS STRUGGLE AGAINST
INCINERATOR viii (2007).

THE

WTI

9
The East End Elementary School‟s emergency response plan involves collecting all 400
students in the cafeteria, sealing the windows and doors with duct tape and turning off the
ventilation system so outside air will not enter the building. This plan seems to assume that
moving the children and sealing the room can be done quickly enough to prevent hazardous
gases from entering the room, and that an explosion at WTI will not break any of the
windows. L.J. Davis, Where are you Al?: Our “Earth in the Balance” Vice President is
Unable—or Unwilling—to Stop Even as Dangerous a Project as the Ohio Incinerator,
MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 1993), http://www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/wti/mother
jones.html. See also Ashley Schannauer, RCRA Endangerment Actions: Is a Permit a
Defense?, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 360 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter Schannauer, Permit a
Defense?].
10
The WTI facility is located at 1250 Saint George Street, East Liverpool, Ohio 43920. A
satellite map of the location is available through Google Maps.
GOOGLE MAPS,
http://www.google.com/maps (enter “1250 Saint George Street, East Liverpool, Ohio 43920”
into query field and follow “Search Maps” hyperlink).
11
These groups include Ohio Citizen Action, Save Our County, and Greenpeace, among
others. See generally SHEVORY, supra note 8.
12

See generally BENJAMIN DAVY, ESSENTIAL INJUSTICE: WHEN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
CANNOT RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE DISPUTES 89-124 (1997).
13

42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1976).

14

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1978).

15

See Greenpeace v. Waste Tech. Indus., 9 F.3d. 1174 (6th Cir. 1993). See also Palumbo
v. Waste Tech. Indus., 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993).
16

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 339.

196

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:193

Congress intended endangerment suits to be under the USEPA‟s authority. 17 By
interpreting this clause so narrowly, courts have limited the use of the RCRA
endangerment action as a remedy and failed to keep up with Europe in providing
citizens with environmental legal protections.
The European Union has taken a broader approach by allowing citizen suits for
potential health dangers stemming from hazardous wastes and other environmental
harms. The European Court of Justice has ruled that the European Union Charter
grants rights not only to Member States but also to the individual citizens of the
Member States.18 These interpretations provide the European citizens remedies
when they face a threat to their health and the environment from a hazardous waste
facility. The European system is more protective than the U.S. model, and is more
concerned with preventing harm to the environment or human health. 19 Under
European law, a substance is presumed hazardous until it is proven to be safe.20 This
is in direct contrast to the U.S., where a substance is assumed to be safe until it is
proven hazardous.
This article will use the WTI case to compare the U.S. and European
environmental legal systems by analyzing what would have happened in the WTI
case if European law had been applied. Part II will give a brief background on the
U.S. and European legal models as they apply to environmental law suits. Part III
will look at how U.S. law was applied to the WTI case. Part IV will analyze the
outcome of the WTI case had European law been applied. Part V will provide a
conclusion and give recommendations on how the laws of the U.S. could be
amended to keep pace with changes in global environmental standards.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss the background information necessary to compare the
U.S. and European laws relevant to environmental lawsuits. This includes a brief
history of the RCRA citizen suit legislation, a WTI facility, and an overview of EU
environmental regulations. The section will end with a discussion how the Council
of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights play a role in protecting
European citizens from environmental harms.
A. History of the RCRA and the Citizen Suit Provision
RCRA is a complicated act. Agency regulations created to interpret and “clarify”
it consume over a thousand pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, not including
the numerous guidance documents printed by both the USEPA and the state agencies
charged with enforcing the statute. 21 RCRA also controls the permits issued to
hazardous waste facilities. Although Congress passed RCRA in 1976, 22 it was not

17

Id. at 308.

18

Id.

19

See generally Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a
Norm of Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221 (1997).
20

Id.

21

JOHN W. TEETS, ET AL., RCRA RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 1 (2003).

22

Id. at 4.
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implemented until 1980, the year Ronald Reagan took office. 23 Reagan appointed
Anne Gorsuch to the position of USEPA director. 24 She was largely considered to
be an unqualified candidate.25 Under her leadership, USEPA enforcement actions
dropped 75%.26 By the time Gorsuch resigned in 1983 over public scandals relating
to the agency, any confidence Congress or the general public had in the USEPA had
largely deteriorated.27 Reagan appointed new leadership in an attempt to convince
Congress that his administration was serious about environmental enforcement, but
the damage to the USEPA‟s reputation had been done. 28
Congress, in response to public distrust of the USEPA‟s ability to enforce
environmental regulations, passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments in
1984.29 The Amendments contained an expanded citizen suit provision 30 that allows
individuals to bring suits to protect themselves from dangers to their health or the
environment even when the USEPA failed to do so.31 The RCRA citizen suit
provision allows for cases to be brought by individuals as follows:
(1) (A) against any person . . . alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this Act . . . ; or
(B) against any person . . . including any past or present generator,
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.32
Although the statute also provides for suits against the USEPA Administrator for
failing to perform a non-discretionary duty,33 this article will limit discussion to the
23

SHEVORY, supra note 8, at 47.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 47-48.

28

TEETS, supra note 21, at 5.

29

Id. at 6.

30

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 308. The Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 expanded the citizen suit provision to include subsection (1)(B)
included above, which allowed citizens to bring suit against facilities which posed an
imminent and substantial threat to human health and the environment. Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3269. Prior to these amendments,
citizen suits were limited to actions against facilities in violation of a permit and suits against
the USEPA Administrator for failing to perform a non-discretionary duty. Id.
31

Jonathan York, The Next Step in Revitalizing RCRA: Maine People’s Alliance and the
Importance of Citizen Intervention in EPA Actions, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405, 406 (2008).
32

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (emphasis added).

33

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2).
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two types of suits listed above as the portions of the statute pertinent to the WTI
facility citizen suits. First, the “permit suits,” brought under 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(A) which allow for cases to be brought against individuals that are in
violation of either RCRA itself, or a permit issued by the USEPA. Second, the
“endangerment suits,” brought under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) which allow for
cases to be brought against facilities that pose an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment. Courts‟ interpretations of the
endangerment suit provision have been so narrow as to bar most actions, as
discussed in more detail below.
Since RCRA was passed in 1976, the United States has fallen behind Europe in
its efforts to protect the environment. 34 The U.S. currently has no federal regulations
targeting climate change or greenhouse gas emissions, unlike the EU which adopted
the Kyoto Protocol in March 2002 and has worked collectively to limit carbon
emissions.35 U.S. states have attempted to regulate their own environments through
more stringent state standards,36 to differing degrees of success. 37 But when states
attempted to control waste within their borders by restricting garbage “imports,”
federal courts found the restrictions violated the Commerce Clause and were
unconstitutional.38 States have also passed a number of measures to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.39 Despite these state measures,40 the U.S. government
has not passed any federal climate change legislation, and climate change cannot be
adequately addressed at the state level.41
The legislative intent behind passing the RCRA citizen suit provision was to
allow citizen enforcement to parallel the USEPA‟s enforcement authority. 42
Allowing citizens to bring suits directly against a facility that poses an imminent and
substantial harm to their health or the environment, rather than merely reporting the
risk to the USEPA, reflects Congress‟ fear that USEPA enforcement actions might
be inadequate.43 With multiple state and federal agencies asserting control over
34

Erin Walter, The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call for
Desperate Measures: Looking to the European Union for a Lesson in Environmental
Protection, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1996).
35
David Vogel, Michael Toffel, Diahanna Post & Nazli Z. Uludere Aragon,
Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States 13-16 (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 10-085, 2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
research/pdf/10-085.pdf.
36

Walter, supra note 34, at 1163.

37

California now has the most stringent automobile emissions standards compared to the
rest of the nation and has become a leader in encouraging the development of zero-emission
vehicles. Vogel, supra note 35, at 4.
38

Id.

39

As of 2003, there were approximately 700 state policies aimed at reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. Id. at 23.
40

Id.

41

Id. at 13-15.

42

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 308.

43

Id.
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hazardous waste facility permits and regulations, it is possible for gaps in regulations
to occur or for problems with a facility to get overlooked. WTI provides an example
of how these gaps can occur.
B. RCRA and the WTI Facility
Permit proceedings for WTI began in 1982 and were conducted by the Ohio
Hazardous Waste Facility Approval Board, the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency (OEPA) and the USEPA.44 The 1,000 citizens that participated in the first
hearing were permitted five minutes each to voice their objections to the siting45 of
the facility and the possible health risks it would pose. 46 Despite numerous
objections from these citizens, the USEPA issued WTI a RCRA permit in 1983. 47
After the USEPA issued the RCRA permit to WTI, the Ohio Hazardous Waste
Facility Board received objections from both state and county officials, as well as
from 19,000 county residents in the form of a petition. 48 In spite of these objections,
the State of Ohio issued WTI the various state permits needed to operate in 1983 and
1984.49
While WTI met all of the relevant USEPA standards for a RCRA permit, USEPA
standards for hazardous waste incinerators are largely based on their technological
capabilities, rather than the potential health risks. 50 The USEPA acknowledges that
its standards may not protect human health or the environment because agency
standards are based on a limited knowledge of the possible health effects of the
chemicals emitted and limited technical capabilities to actually monitor the
emissions.51 Not all of the compounds released by hazardous waste incinerators
have been identified, and some released compounds, such as dioxins 52 and furans,
are more hazardous than the waste in its original state before incineration. 53
Although the Clean Air Act does provide an additional set of regulations by
controlling air emissions, the regulations are inadequate because the Act is only
concerned with a very limited number of pollutants. 54 Some experts believe that
environmental harms go unregulated because Congress tends to over-rely on
44

DAVY, supra note 12, at 93.

45

“Site” is defined as a prospective location for something, particularly a public building
or industrial plant. BALLENTINE‟S‟S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010) (LEXIS).
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at n. 47.

50

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 329.

51

Id. at 332.

52

The type of dioxin released by WTI is considered the most potent carcinogen and the
most potent reproductive toxin ever evaluated by the USEPA. Greenpeace v. Waste Tech.
Industries, No. 4:93CV083, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5001, at *47-49 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5,
1993).
53

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 332-33.

54

Id. at 338.
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scientific evidence when forming environmental legislation. 55 Congressional
overreliance on scientific evidence is especially problematic because scientific data
is not always available to address all the issues that may be relevant to a specific
piece of legislation.56 Because RCRA performance standards do not regulate the
emission of dangerous substances like dioxin or mercury, there is no relevant part of
the USEPA permit process that addresses the impact of the substances on human
health or the environment.57 The permit process is inadequate to address citizen‟s
concerns about possible health risks from a hazardous waste facility.
One of the primary objections opponents have to WTI is that it is located too
close to schools and homes. Unfortunately, not one of the many state or federal
agencies involved in issuing permits to WTI conducted a comprehensive
examination of whether the site was suitable for a hazardous waste incinerator.58
Siting of a hazardous waste facility is controlled by local governments through
zoning ordinances.59 In 1967, local authorities zoned the land where WTI would
later be sited for general industrial activities. 60 The land was originally intended to
be a port for the city of East Liverpool.61 But there is a big difference between the
environmental impact of a port and the environmental impact of a hazardous waste
incinerator.
Under federal law, the only relevant siting criteria to the USEPA are the facility‟s
proximity to flood plains, salt domes, underground mines, or seismically hazardous
locations.62 There is nothing in the USEPA regulations that forbids a hazardous
waste incinerator from being located in a residential area. 63 However, a report by the
federal General Accounting Office found problems with the federal floodplain
regulations and the WTI site on the Ohio River, even within the limited scope of the
USEPA‟s siting criteria.64 Perhaps as a response to some of these siting problems,
soon after Ohio issued WTI a permit to operate, the state amended its permit
standards to exclude hazardous waste facilities from locations near homes or
schools.65
While the state and federal permits were issued in 1983 and 1984, due to changes
in WTI‟s ownership, construction did not begin until 1990 and was completed in

55
See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999).
56

Id. at 181-83.

57

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 340.

58

DAVY, supra note 12, at 125.

59

See generally State Law and Programs under RCRA, 4-25B Zoning and Land Use
Controls § 25B.17 (MB) (2011).
60

DAVY, supra note 12, at 124.

61

Id.

62

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 337.

63

Id.

64

DAVY, supra note 12, at 125-26.

65

Id. at 95.
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1992.66 In November 1992, shakedown67 operations began.68 In March of 1993, the
eight-day trial burn occurred in which the USEPA tested the facility‟s ability to meet
emission regulations.69 WTI did not meet emission regulations. 70 Despite this
failure, the USEPA allowed WTI to continue with the post-trial burn, a period that
follows the test burn and lasts until final operating conditions for the facility are
established by the USEPA, typically lasting one to two years. 71 The USEPA then
decided not to establish final operating conditions until the results of the risk
assessment were available.72 Because of this decision, the WTI post trial burn period
lasted until January 25, 1995, when WTI‟s initial RCRA permit expired without final
operating conditions ever being established.73 When the risk assessment was finally
released on May 8, 1997, approximately fourteen years after the initial RCRA permit
was issued, it found that cancer risks were within acceptable limits and that noncancer health effects were not expected.74 The positive risk assessment allowed WTI
operations to continue uninterrupted.75
C. History of EU Environmental Regulations
The European Union (EU), with its multiple levels of government, functions
using a similar form of federalism as the United States.76 The European Parliament
(Parliament) functions as Congress would in the United States. 77 Its members are
elected by the citizens of the Member States of the European Union and it is
responsible for drafting legislation. 78 In much the same way the Senate and the
House of Representatives share legislative duties in the U.S., the Parliament shares
its legislative duties with the Council of Ministers (Ministers). 79 The Ministers can
use different instruments to enact laws, the most important being directives and
66

Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 44.

67

“Shakedown” is the term used to describe initial pretest burning. SHEVORY, supra note
8, at 128.
68

Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 44.

69

Id. at 44-45.

70

Id. at 45.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 341.

74

Schannauer, WTI Risk Assessments, supra note 6, at 35.

75

Id. The conditions of an expired EPA permit continue in force until the effective date of
the new permit. 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) (2005).
76
77

Walter, supra note 34, at 1173.
Id.

78

Welcome to the European Parliament, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do;jsessionid=9DFDE58167A8C14A5AA87896AF
7DDD17.node2?id=146&language=en (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
79

See JANET R. HUNTER & ZACHARY A. SMITH, PROTECTING OUR
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-39 (2005).
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regulations, to be discussed in more detail below. 80 The civil service of the EU is the
European Commission, which is charged with implementing policies, enforcing
laws, and allocating funds. 81 It also holds some legislative functions in the form of
drafting proposals for new laws, although it does not have the power to pass the
legislation.82 Citizens may lodge a complaint with the Court if the European
Parliament, Ministers, or Commission fails to make a decision required by any EU
Treaty.83 Citizens may also petition Parliament on any matter that affects citizens
directly and falls within the purview of the EU. 84 A committee within Parliament
reviews the petitions, considers any evidence, holds hearings, and then submits a
report to the rest of Parliament with the outcomes. 85 This provides citizens one
avenue to get their cause before the EU outside of the courts.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) acts as the judicial branch of the EU. 86 It is
assisted in its duties by the Court of First Instance (CFI), created in 1988 to be
responsible for giving rulings on cases brought by individuals, companies, and those
relating to competition law.87 The CFI was created to ease the case load of the ECJ
to allow EU citizens greater access to legal protection.88 The ECJ itself has
jurisdiction over cases against Member States for failing to fulfill their obligations
under EU law, which may be brought by either the European Commission
(Commission) or, less frequently, by one Member State against another. 89 Citizens
can bring an action for damages before the ECJ if they have suffered as a result of
the action or inaction of the EU.90 However, a citizen cannot bring an action before
the ECJ against a Member State for a failure to fulfill an obligation that the state has
under EU law, which is left to the discretion of the Commission. 91
The EU did not begin enacting environmental legislation until after the U.S.,
primarily because the Treaty of Rome, which created the EU, 92 did not initially
contain a provision for environmental regulation. 93 But once the Single European
80

Id. at 37-38.

81

Id. at 33.

82

Id.

83

The Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/
justice/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Court of Justice].
84

Hunter, supra note 79, at 39.

85

Id. at 39-40.

86

Court of Justice, supra note 83.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Curia Court of Justice Presentation, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
90

Court of Justice, supra note 86.

91

Id.

92
Celebrating Europe! 50th Anniversary of the
http://europa.eu/50/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
93

Vogel, supra note 35, at 2.

Treaty

of

Rome,

EUROPA,
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Act94 was passed in 1987, environmental regulation increased because there was a
clear legal basis for environmental legislation. 95 The Act added a new title to the
Treaty, headed “Environment,” which set Community objectives on the
environment.96 Since this Act, the EU has implemented several policies to mitigate
climate change.97 In 2002, the EU obliged each member state to adopt the Kyoto
Protocol, which was signed by the U.S. but was never sent to the Senate for
ratification.98 The treaty requires that emissions be reduced to 8% below 1990 levels
by 2012.99 Although Member States still have the power to issue permits to
industries that create emissions, the EU asks that the number of permits issued
complies with the Kyoto Protocol.100 Additionally, Community Directives require
that Member States only grant licenses to industrial plants which apply the best
available technology.101 Because the EU‟s constitutional authority is only about two
decades old, it is sensitive to the impact different state standards will have on the
market and seems less willing to accept divergent environmental standards than the
U.S.102
The European Parliament passed Directive 76/2000 on December 4, 2000, which
regulates the incineration of waste.103 This Directive is the most recent update by the
legislature to the EU laws regulating the incineration of waste dating back to
1989.104 Much like RCRA, the Directive requires facilities to apply for and obtain
permits.105 While the Directive does not contain a specific provision that allows for
suits to be brought against the operators of facilities for posing a danger to health or
94

Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
95

Vogel, supra note 35, at 2.

96

Francis Jacobs, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the
Environment, 18 J. ENVTL. L. 185, 186 (2006).
97

Vogel, supra note 35, at 15.

98

Id. at 22, 30.

99

Id. at 15.

100

Id. at 15-16.

101

McIntyre, supra note 19, at 231; Council Directive 2006/118/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 19.

102

Vogel, supra note 35, at 35.

103

Council Directive 2000/76/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 332) 91 [hereinafter Incineration
Directive].
104

Waste Incineration Summary of Legislation, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/environment/waste_management/l28072_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
105
See Incineration Directive, supra note 102. The European Union requires facilities to,
as much as possible, capture the heat generated during the incineration process to be used to
create electricity. Although WTI was first advertised as a heat-to-energy plant, WTI has
generated no electricity as of 2008. SHEVORY, supra note 9, at 76. See also Jason Bourne,
WTI, A Toxic Incinerator 1,100 Feet From an Ohio Elementary School, Hillary and Bill,
PROGRESSOHIO COMMUNITY BLOG, http://www.progressohio.org/blog/2008/02/C3Z4.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011). There is no information about any heat-to-energy recovery on the
WTI company website. HERITAGE-WTI, www.heritage-wti.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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the environment,106 suits can be brought against these facilities using other means, to
be discussed in detail below.
Perhaps one reason the EU has been able to make such strides in environmental
regulation is its adoption of the “precautionary principal.” 107 The precautionary
principal is based on the idea that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 108 It is a rejection of
the traditional “assimilative capacity approach” which is based on the assumption
that science could determine the environment‟s capacity and could sufficiently
mitigate threats to capacity before there is irreparable environmental damage. 109 The
problem with the assimilative capacity approach is that sometimes scientific
certainty comes too late, which is why international law has recently seen a shift
towards the better-safe-than-sorry precautionary approach.110
In the 1992
amendments to the Treaty of Rome, the requirement was included that all
environmental policy in the EU shall be based on the precautionary principle. 111
Because of this amendment, environmental citizen suits brought in the EU face a
lower burden of proof than plaintiffs in the U.S., who must prove the specific cause
for the environmental harm complained of.
D. The Council of Europe and Human Rights
The Treaty of London established the Council of Europe in 1949. 112 In contrast
to the European Union, whose goal was to unify Europe through purely economic
means, the Council of Europe (Council) aimed to unify the continent through
broader social, political, and cultural means. 113 To help fulfill these goals, the
Council formed the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) in 1950,
which entered into force in 1953.114 The Convention can be amended through
protocols, which add rights to the Convention and allow it to evolve. 115 The
Convention created the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1959, which
consists of one judge per member state.116
106

See generally Incineration Directive, supra note 102.

107

McIntyre, supra note 19, at 230.
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Id. at 229.
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Id. at 17; The European Court of Human Rights in 50 Questions, THE EUROPEAN COURT
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BDCBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter ECHR in 50].
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ECHR in 50, supra note 113, at 5. Protocols bind only the states that ratify them
individually. Id.
116
HOWARD DAVIS, supra note 111, at 17; ECHR in 50, supra note 113, at 6. Originally, a
European Commission of Human Rights was created which decided the cases the ECHR
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Cases are brought before the ECHR when one state brings a case against another
state for human rights violations or, more commonly, when an individual brings suit
against their own state.117 A case before the ECHR proceeds through two stages. 118
In the first stage, a single judge will determine whether the case can proceed,
considering whether the application meets certain admissibility requirements. 119
These requirements include the exhaustion of domestic remedies, that the complaint
falls under the Convention, and that all procedural requirements have been met. 120 If
all requirements are met, the case will proceed to the second stage where the ECHR
will make a determination on the merits. 121 The case will be heard by a panel of
seven judges which must include the judge representing the state against which the
case has been lodged.122 The rulings are enforced by the Ministers of the Council of
Europe who work with the state to decide how to execute the judgment and prevent
further violations.123
III. ANALYSIS
This section will begin by discussing the ways citizens may get an environmental
suit heard in the U.S., the EU, and before the ECHR. It will analyze the way the
RCRA statute was applied in the two citizen suits brought against the WTI facility,
and then proceed with a discussion on how the WTI suits may have turned out if
European law had been applied. Next, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and how its provisions may apply to the United States will be discussed.
A. The RCRA Endangerment Suit Provision
The RCRA endangerment suit provision, which allows citizens to bring suits
against facilities that pose an imminent and substantial threat to human health and
the environment, may seem generous to plaintiffs, but it bars citizen suits in two
important areas.124 First, it does not allow challenges to the siting of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility. 125 This leaves citizens with only the comment period
provided by the USEPA during the permit process to challenge the proposed site of a
facility. While parties may appeal the decision of the USEPA if it does issue a
permit, this remedy is not equivalent to a RCRA citizen suit. An appeal of an
would hear, but it was abolished in 1998 and the Court now decides for itself which cases will
be heard. HOWARD DAVIS, supra note 111, at 19.
117

Only states that have ratified the Convention can have cases brought against them
before the ECHR. ECHR in 50, supra note 113, at 7-8.
118

Id. at 8.
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William H. Rodgers, Jr., Occasions for Judicial Review—District Courts—Citizen Suits,
4 ENVTL. L. § 7.6 (2010).
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agency decision, such as the decision to issue a permit,126 is controlled by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the appeal will go to the appropriate
Circuit Court, rather than the District Court where a RCRA suit would be brought. 127
At the Circuit Court level, the APA requires deference be given to agency
expertise.128 In contrast, no deference is given to an agency decision in a RCRA
citizen suit.129 Without the deference to an agency‟s expertise, a suit brought under
RCRA has a lower burden of proof for plaintiffs than a suit brought under the APA.
Second, the permit process focuses on a facility‟s ability to comply with
technical performance standards, while endangerment actions focus on a facility‟s
impact on human health or the environment. 130 It is possible for a facility to comply
with all technical standards and still pose a threat to human health. 131 Because
endangerment suits raise issues that are not directly addressed in permit proceedings,
they should not be barred as a collateral attack of an agency decision. 132
One possible reason the USEPA is given preference when a citizen appeals a
permit decision under the Administrative Procedure Act is because of the many steps
and requirements a facility must meet in order to obtain a valid RCRA permit. Any
facility involved in the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste must
maintain a valid RCRA permit to legally operate.133 The process a facility must
undergo to obtain a permit includes an informal meeting with the public, and
preparing and submitting an application to the USEPA. 134 The USEPA will review
the applications and prepare a draft permit, which will be submitted to the public for
public comment.135 After the close of the public comment period, a final permit is
issued that incorporates all the terms imposed on a facility for it to comply with
relevant RCRA conditions.136 RCRA permits are valid for a period of ten years,
although the USEPA has wide discretion to modify the terms of the permit whenever
necessary to protect human health and the environment. 137

126

42 U.S.C. § 6976.
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Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1993).
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Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 345.
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42 U.S.C. § 6976.
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Schannauer, Permit a Defense?, supra note 9, at 323.
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See generally Schannauer, Permit a Defense, supra note 9.

132
Id. An additional limit imposed on citizen suits is that the recovery allowed is a civil
penalty, rather than a monetary reward. Although the goal of most citizen suits is injunctive
relief, the inability to receive monetary compensation may deter some plaintiffs from bringing
suits or attorneys from accepting suits, even though RCRA allows courts to award attorney
fees to the prevailing party. See Rodgers, supra note 123, at 2. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).
133

See generally Treatment Storage and Disposal (TSD) Facilities for Hazardous Waste, 425B Zoning and Land Use Controls § 25B.04 (MB) (2011).
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1. The Burford Abstention Doctrine
The Burford abstention doctrine is sometimes applied to environmental suits. 138
The doctrine mandates the dismissal of a case by federal court if a complex state
regulatory scheme is central to the lawsuit. 139 When determining whether to abstain
under Burford, federal courts should consider: (1) whether the suit is based on a
cause of action which is exclusively federal; (2) whether difficult or unusual state
laws are at issue; (3) whether there is a need for coherent state doctrine in the area;
and, (4) whether state procedures indicate a desire to create a special state forum for
adjudication.140 The types of complex regulatory schemes where Burford is usually
applied are cases where the state scheme requires unified state administration, and
there is specialized state court review available. 141 A central factor for courts
granting abstention is how important the state law is to the state and whether the
issue transcends the case at bar.142 Abstention is unwarranted when the case can be
fully resolved applying federal law. 143
B. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is based in Luxembourg and made up of
one judge from each Member State. 144 It settles disputes between Member States,
EU institutions, and individuals, and makes sure that EU legislations is interpreted
and applied consistently throughout the EU.145 Although the Single European Act
gave the ECJ the jurisdiction to hear environmental cases, the court was ruling on
cases affecting the environment in the name of regulating trade and the free
movement of goods before that Act was passed. 146 In a 1985 case, two years before
the Single European Act, the ECJ ruled that although maintaining the free movement
of goods was vital, it was not absolute.147 Instead, it determined that certain limits
on trade could be justified if they were in the interest of pursuing community
138

Like many jurisdictional doctrines, this doctrine is named after the case in which it first
appeared. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
139

James L. Buchwalter, Propriety of Federal Court’s Abstention, Under Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943) as to Claim that State or Local
Statute or Regulation, or Application Thereof, Violates Federal Constitution or Conflicts with
Federal Statute or Regulation—Issues Other than Land Use, Zoning, Social Welfare, or
Family Law, 25 A.L.R. FED. 2D 207 (2010).
140

White & Brewer Trucking v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (1997).
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James L. Buchwalter, Propriety of Federal Court’s Abstention, Under Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943), as to Claim that State of Local
Statute or Regulation, or Application Thereof, Violates Federal Constitution or Conflicts with
Federal Statute or Regulation—Land Use and Zoning Issues, 30 A.L.R. FED. 2D 285 (2010).
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objectives, such as the protection of the environment.148 This was the first time that
the protection of the environment was stated as an objective of the EU, and was a
departure from the court‟s earlier approach which stressed economic integration
above all else.149 The ECJ issued this ruling in favor of environmental protection
before there was an explicit legal basis for them to do so.150
When determining whether a measure that restricts free trade in the name of
environmental protection is reasonable, the ECJ and the courts of the Member States
evaluate environmental protection measures using a two-tier approach.151 First, the
court asks whether the environmental objective is acceptable. 152 If it is acceptable,
the court looks to see whether the measure achieves the environmental objective
while minimizing restrictions on free trade and competition. 153 The EU expressly
prohibits restrictions on the movement of goods between Member States, unlike the
U.S. Constitution which does not.154 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit state restrictions on interstate
commerce.155
Unfortunately, because most environmental legislation is laid out in the form of
directives, the role of citizen suits is limited.156 The ECJ does not allow private
parties to use legislation set out in directives against another private party. 157
Directives impose minimum requirements on Member States, but give them
discretion as to the way the directive is carried out. 158 As long as the desired result
of the directive is achieved, the Member States have fulfilled their obligations. 159 A
regulation, in contrast, sets out both the result to be achieved as well as the method
for achieving that result.160 Because directives leave much more discretion up to
Member States, they are often adopted more frequently than other forms of
legislation because they allow states with different views to reach a consensus more
easily.161 Citizens can still bring cases against the EU for their action or inaction, but
148
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Id. at 195.
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Commerce Clause to prohibit state restrictions on interstate commerce. Id. at 1174.
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the use of directives severely limits horizontal private enforcement relating to
environmental laws.162
1. Citizen Standing Before the ECJ
Effective citizen enforcement of EU environmental law depends on whether a
citizen can invoke EU law when bringing a case within a Member State. There are
three doctrines which allow a citizen to invoke EU law within a Member State:
direct effect, consistent enforcement, and state liability. 163 The direct effect doctrine
is the most pertinent to environmental enforcement and applies to those aspects of
EU law that are enforceable within Member States even if that Member State does
not have a specific national law speaking to the provision. 164 The direct effect
doctrine is a doctrine that allows a citizen to invoke EU law within the courts of a
Member State.165 Under the doctrine of direct effect, the ECJ has ruled that the EU
intends to confer certain rights to individuals that can be enforced in national courts
if the provisions of EU law are both unconditional and sufficiently precise. 166 But
because most environmental legislation is set out in directives, and directives are
intentionally imprecise because they leave implementation up to the Member States,
the direct effect doctrine is of limited use for private citizens bringing environmental
citizen suits.167 Horizontal direct effect actions, those brought by one group or
citizen against another group or citizen, are very limited because they are seen as too
great an interference in the Member States‟ systems. 168 But the ECJ has allowed for
“horizontal side effects” when citizens bring vertical direct effect cases, which occur
when a private group or citizen brings a case against a government entity. 169 This
would allow a citizen to challenge the decision of a regulatory agency such as a
decision to issue a permit, a vertical direct effect action with the horizontal side
effect that the facility‟s permit could be revoked. 170 This is in direct contrast to the
U.S. law under RCRA, which allows a citizen to challenge the facility horizontally if
it poses an imminent threat to human health and the environment but gives deference
to agency decisions under the APA. 171
Another way individual citizens can get their case before the ECJ is by lodging
complaints with the Commission.172 The Commission brought action against Ireland
162
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for a failure to fulfill their obligations under a directive on waste because of a series
of complaints received by Irish citizens between 1997 and 2000. 173 The purpose of
the waste directive was to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering
human health or the environment.174 A total of twelve complaints were received, all
concerning the unauthorized dumping of waste. 175 Ireland failed to respond to the
Commission‟s formal notices regarding the complaints. 176 The ECJ found that
Ireland‟s failure to comply with the waste directive was persistent and widespread,
and that it had failed to establish a national network of waste disposal that did not
endanger human health or the environment. 177
2. Greenpeace v. Commission
Greenpeace, a private entity, brought suit against the Commission as a vertical
direct effect suit with potential horizontal direct effect consequences. 178 In March
1991, the Commission agreed to provide financial assistance to Spain for the
construction of two power plants which were to be located on the Canary Islands.179
Financial assistance would be provided in the amount of approximately ECU
108,000,000 with payments to be spread over four years. 180 Part of the agreement
provided that payments would be suspended or reduced if irregularities in
construction were found or if there were any changes in the plans which were not
approved by the Commission in advance. 181 In December 1991, two individual
citizens sent a letter to the Commission saying that no environmental impact
assessment study had been performed as required under EU law. 182 Two
environmental impact statements were later issued in December 1992 by the Canary
Islands Commission for Planning and the Environment.183 Based on the impact
statements, Greenpeace challenged the EU‟s decision to continue funding the
project.184 The EU Commission‟s Director General upheld the decision to provide
funds by saying that its decisions were made after full consultation with those
concerned.185 Greenpeace appealed to the CFI, which upheld the Commission‟s
decision to continue funding. 186 In its order the CFI found Greenpeace and
173
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associated individual citizens did not have standing to bring the action, and
distinguished between individuals and environmental associations. 187
Greenpeace appealed the CFI‟s decision to the ECJ,188 which proceeded with an
in-depth analysis on the issue of standing in EU law. 189 EU case law had limited
standing for individuals to issues that affect them “by reason of certain attributes that
are peculiar to them,” distinguishing them from the general population as the person
to whom the legislation is addressed.190 In this case, the applicants would be
affected by any court decision in this case in the same way that all other residents of
the Canary Islands would be.191 However, the CFI had failed to consider the effect
of the recently revised Article 173 of the EU Treaty, which provided that any legal
person may institute proceedings if they hold a legal interest affected by the
contested act or decision.192 Greenpeace argued that this rewritten Article 173
confers rights on people who may be concerned with EU projects, such as the
Canary Islands project, that significantly affect the environment. 193
The ECJ upheld the decision of the CFI. 194 Standing, in an environmental suit, is
based on whether the individual‟s quality of life will be affected by the decision, and
in this case it was not clear how the individual‟s quality of life would each be
affected.195 It expressed concern that if it were to allow standing for environmental
groups generally, then individuals who did not have standing would get around this
by creating an environmental group.196 Moreover, if environmental groups were
able to challenge every law that had an impact on the environment there would be an
endless amount of litigation. 197 If the ECJ had found that Greenpeace and the
individual appellants had standing, it would have significantly liberalized the
standing requirements for environmental plaintiffs.198
C. European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), signed in 1950,
contains no provision that expressly provides for the protection of the
187
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environment.199 But in 1990, the Council of Europe went on to adopt the Dublin
Declaration on “The Environmental Imperative” stating that Community action
“must be to guarantee citizens the right to a clean and healthy environment.” 200 And
by 1993, the ECHR was willing to allow for creative arguments to be made that
environmental protection fell under one of the existing Articles. 201 The court hears
environmental cases primarily under Article 8, the right to respect for home and
private life, but has considered cases argued under Article 1, the right to peaceful
enjoyment of possessions; Article 2, the right to life; and Article 10, the right to
freedom of expression.202 Bringing a case before the ECHR does require the
exhaustion of domestic remedies much like the other courts discussed. 203
Environmental human rights under the Convention differs from other human rights
concerns because environmental protection is often pursued as being in the best
interest of all, as opposed to other human rights that focus on the interest of the
individual.204 This can be a limitation for plaintiffs because the human rights system
is designed to protect individuals, rather than society generally.205
1. State as Environmental Protector
Individuals also bring suit before the ECHR when a State, in attempting to
protect the environment, acts to violate an individual‟s property interest. 206 A
primary example is when permits, such as fishing or building permits, are denied or
revoked in the interest of environmental protection, such as preserving fish stocks or
green space.207 These suits are often brought under Article 1, the right to property. 208
But, if the permit applicant felt they were denied a fair hearing before their permit
was revoked or denied, they may bring the case under Article 6, the right to a fair
trial.209 The right to a fair trial is a procedural rather than a substantive right, but
procedural rights can be just as effective as substantive rights in determining the
outcome of a case.
In deciding cases where an individual brings suit against a State for a human
rights violation in the name of environmental protection, the ECHR must weigh the
199
Justine Thornton & Stephen Tromans, Human Rights and Environmental Wrongs:
Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights: Some Thoughts on the
Consequences for UK Environmental Law, 11 J. ENVTL. L. 35, 35-36 (1999).
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competing interests between the duties of the State to protect the environment for all
and the rights of the individual.210 First, the ECHR determines whether the State
acted lawfully based on its own internal law. 211 Second, the ECHR determines
whether the State acted with a legitimate purpose.212 A legitimate purpose is widely
defined as anything in the public interest, and the ECHR has given States a great
deal of discretion.213 The ECHR, by accepting the protection of the environment as
a legitimate government purpose, has expanded and legitimized the States‟ role in
environmental protection.214 Finally, the ECHR attempts to balance the competing
interests of the State and the individual, specifically looking to whether the
individual has to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden. 215
2. State Fails to Provide Environmental Protection
Another type of environmental suit brought before the ECHR is when an
individual brings suit against a State for failing to take the necessary steps to protect
individuals from environmental harms.216 In these cases, the ECHR does not grant
the States a great deal of discretion.217 Rather, it takes a strict approach to State
actions and looks at whether they were strictly necessary to achieve the government
purpose.218 The State‟s justification for their actions is generally economic, and
economic justifications are not seen as sufficient by the ECHR. 219 The ECHR will
consider whether there were any alternatives the State could have implemented that
would have prevented the environmental harm. 220 If an alternative exists, then the
State‟s actions would not have been strictly necessary and a human rights violation
would have occurred.221
One ECHR case involving the protection of the environment is Giacomelli v.
Italy.222 Giacomelli, an individual citizen of Italy, brought complaint against the
Italian Republic in 1998 for failing to protect her right to respect for her home and
private life under Article 8. 223 Giacomelli lived about 100 feet away from the
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Ecoservizi plant, which specialized in the treatment and storage of hazardous and
non-hazardous waste.224 Ecoservizi began operating in 1982, and its license
expanded in 1989 to include the detoxification of waste, which involved treating the
hazardous waste with other chemicals.225 Between 1991 and 1999, Ecoservizi‟s
license was further expanded to allow for an increase in the quantity of waste it
processed and its license was also renewed a number of times, which Giacomelli
continuously challenged in Italian courts. 226 Plaintiff claimed an environmental
impact assessment, very similar to the USEPA risk assessment, should have been
completed prior to a license being issued but was not completed until 1996, seven
years after Ecoservizi began operations.227 The Italian Regional EPA also found
high levels of ammonia in the atmosphere indicating a failure in the plant‟s
detoxification process.228 The Italian authorities argued that it had not been proven
that the facility was dangerous.229 The ECHR ruled that authorities cannot wait until
comprehensive data is available for each and every aspect of the matter to act, and
found in favor of Giacomelli in the amount of approximately $15,000 plus attorney
fees.230
3. Limitations of the ECHR
Although the ECHR can be a powerful tool for a plaintiff faced with an
environmental danger, it is not without its limitations. Only about five to fifteen
percent of cases filed actually get heard by the Court each year. 231 In those cases
where plaintiffs have been successful, the facts have been extreme, 232 and human
rights apply solely to individual humans, so any case which relates to the protection
of the environment generally, or to the protection of animal or plant species, is
outside the scope of the ECHR.233 Moreover, a case brought before the ECHR can
take several years to come to fruition. 234 Under the precautionary principle, the law
should strive to prevent environmental harm before it occurs, and if a plaintiff must
wait 13 years for a remedy, as Giacomelli did, a substantial harm will likely have
already occurred. Therefore, the ECHR should be viewed as a last resort for a
plaintiff trying to remedy an environmental harm; indeed, the ECHR requires all
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domestic remedies be exhausted before it hears a case. 235 It may serve as a safety net
for plaintiffs who have no other legal options, but because so few cases are heard by
the Court, and because those cases that were successful were so egregious in their
facts, the ECHR should not be relied upon by citizens to resolve their environmental
disputes.
D. How RCRA Was Applied to the WTI Facility
This section will discuss how the District and Circuit Courts applied, and
misapplied, the RCRA statute to the two citizen endangerment suits brought against
the WTI facility.
1. Palumbo v. West Technologies Industries
Michael Palumbo, the Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, brought
Palumbo v. Waste Tech. Industries on behalf of the citizens of the State of West
Virginia, joined by City of Chester, West Virginia. 236 The City of Chester is located
directly across the Ohio River from WTI.237 The case came before the District Court
in the Northern District of West Virginia. 238 Plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that the facility was not built in accordance with flood plain standards, and that the
levels of lead and sulfur dioxide emissions allowed under the RCRA permit,
combined with the unregulated emissions of phosgene gas, would endanger human
health and the environment. 239 WTI responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.240 The district court denied the
motion, reading the citizen suit provision as providing the district court‟s jurisdiction
where there are allegations, acts or omissions may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 241 The district court certified
the jurisdictional question for interlocutory appeal, and proceeded to hear the
plaintiffs‟ case while the appeal was pending. 242
During the case on the merits, plaintiffs presented experts on public health who
criticized the facility‟s location near residences and an elementary school.243 WTI,
the USEPA, and the OEPA argued that compliance with the terms of the permits
would adequately protect human health. 244 The district court ruled in favor of WTI
and denied the plaintiffs‟ request for a preliminary injunction to halt operations at
235
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the facility.245 Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.246 Before the appeal could proceed, the Circuit Court ruled on the
jurisdictional question that had been the basis of the defendants‟ interlocutory
appeal.247
a. The Fourth Circuit Misapplied the Administrative Procedure Act
The Fourth Circuit determined that the RCRA endangerment suit was not
appropriate and that plaintiffs‟ case was nothing more than a collateral attack on the
USEPA‟s decision to issue WTI a permit.248 The court emphasized that Congress
provided circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from agency decisions,
leaving the district court without jurisdiction in this case. 249
Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, an appeal of a final agency decision is brought before
the circuit courts with a standard of review deferential to agency expertise. 250 The
court reasoned that plaintiffs who brought suits in district court as RCRA
endangerment suits would be able to avoid the deferential standard circuit courts
apply in an agency appeal.251
The Fourth Circuit‟s reasoning in this case is contrary to the clear language of the
statute. The statute states that “any action . . . shall be brought in the district court
for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment
may occur.”252 The Fourth Circuit erroneously treated an appeal of a USEPA
permitting decision as analogous to a RCRA citizen suit action. The doctrine of res
judicata applies when a case is substantially identical to a cause of action that has
already been decided,253 but because different aspects of the facility were being
challenged during the endangerment suit than during the permit process, this
doctrine should not have applied. A RCRA citizen suit raises issues that are not
addressed during the USEPA permitting process because the permit process does not
always address concerns about human health. 254
Additionally, the Administrative Procedure Act that the Fourth Circuit refers to
was passed in 1946255 while the RCRA citizen suit provision was passed as part of
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act in 1984.256 Being aware of its
245
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prior legislation, Congress chose to provide citizens with the endangerment suit as
an additional remedy from environmental harms than that provided by the
Administrative Procedures Act. “Congress‟ consistent provision for citizen suits in
environmental legislations „evince[s] a legislative intent that “citizen[s] are not to be
treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcome participants in the
vindication of environmental interests.”‟” 257 While the court may not see any
evidence that Congress intended to eviscerate the permitting process it established, 258
RCRA itself seems to provide adequate evidence that it did. Congress passed the
endangerment suit provision providing exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts 259
and offered a distinct and separate cause of action than that provided under the
Administrative Procedures Act. Congress‟ clear intent was that district courts should
have jurisdiction over endangerment claims brought under RCRA.
b. The Fourth Circuit Misapplied the Burford Doctrine
The court went on to dismiss all counts where the plaintiffs challenged the
decisions of the OEPA by inappropriately applying the Burford abstention
doctrine.260 In 1983, the Sixth Circuit, ruling on another RCRA case, explained that
Burford is not appropriate merely because resolving the question at hand may
overturn state policy.261 The state must have an overriding interest in the case and
federal review would disrupt the state‟s efforts in establishing a coherent policy. 262
Federal courts should not abstain from hearing cases merely because the law is
difficult to determine.263 In RCRA suits, the federal and state agencies share
jurisdiction with federal law dictating the environmental standards and state
regulations supplementing enforcement. In fact, RCRA contemplates a federal-state
partnership for enforcement where a state hazardous waste program becomes
authorized by the USEPA.264 Additionally, the objective of the RCRA statute is to
“promote the protection of health and the environment” through “a cooperative effort
among the Federal State and local governments.”265 This cooperation places
257
Greenpeace, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5001, at *12 (quoting Proffitt v. Comm‟rs of
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concerns raised under RCRA within the jurisdiction of federal courts. Applying the
Burford abstention doctrine in cases such as this would provide defendants an “end
run around RCRA” by opposing cases as being barred by this doctrine. 266
2. Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Industries
On January 12, 1993, Greenpeace and eight local Ohio citizens brought this
case267 before federal District Judge Ann Aldrich in the Northern District of Ohio,
just 48 hours before WTI was scheduled to begin the trial burn period. 268 Under
normal circumstances, after a test burn is completed, a facility would then enter a
post-test burn period where it is permitted to burn hazardous waste pending the
outcome of the test burn results. 269 This period may last as long as one to two
years.270 Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the facility would pose an endangerment
to human health and the environment because of indirect exposure to dioxin
emissions through the food chain.271 Because plaintiffs brought this case under the
citizen suit provision of RCRA, the district court‟s inquiry was limited to whether
the incinerator posed “an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.”272 The plaintiffs were unable to introduce direct evidence as
regarding the siting of WTI.273
After considering testimony from USEPA officials, scientists, and others, Judge
Aldrich ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the facility did pose an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the health and the environment. 274 The court found
that releases from the facility would likely cause an additional 4 cancer deaths per
100,000 residents per year, stating:
This risk for one year of emissions is four times higher than any
analogous acceptable risk for lifetime emissions. When this is considered
along with the non-cancer effects, this Court finds it clear that the
operation of the WTI facility during the post trial burn period clearly may
cause imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the
environment. It is patently unsafe to subject the population exposed to the
facility's emissions to the risks involved in incineration while the USEPA
determines what the risk is and what risk is acceptable.275
In its ruling dated March 5, 1993, the court held that WTI would be permitted to
operate during the eight-day test burn period because the risk from such a short burn
266
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period would not be as great. 276 But the district court did order an injunction barring
the facility from operating during the post-test burn period.277 Opponents of this
facility viewed the ruling as a major victory,278 but their celebration was short lived.
Judge Aldrich‟s ruling was appealed by WTI to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals on March 8, 1993. WTI requested an emergency stay of the district court‟s
order. On March 16, 1993, just 11 days after the lower court‟s ruling, the Sixth
Circuit granted WTI‟s request.279 In April 1993, WTI began burning hazardous
waste after the OEPA authorized limited operations. 280
The Sixth Circuit entered its ruling in favor of WTI on November 19, 1993. 281
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case.282 In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit focused on the timing of the suit
and noted that there was nothing to indicate that the dioxin risk was something that
could not have been raised at any of the numerous prior proceedings. 283 Instead, the
Sixth Circuit suspected that the plaintiffs had waited to bring the case before the
district court, rather than take advantage of other administrative options, in order to
bring the case before what they believed would be a more favorable forum. 284 The
court also followed the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Palumbo, which ruled the
RCRA citizen suit was nothing more than a collateral attack on the USEPA decision
to issue WTI a permit.285
The Sixth Circuit failed to take into account that dioxin emissions are not directly
regulated under RCRA.286 Because dioxin emissions were not considered by the
USEPA when issuing RCRA permits, an attack on dioxin emissions cannot be a
collateral attack and res judicata does not apply. The Sixth Circuit erroneously
determined that the plain language of the statute made it clear that the RCRA citizen
suit was not to be used to challenge a permitted facility. 287 But the Sixth Circuit‟s
interpretation of the statute is circular.
If no cause of action can be brought against a permitted facility, then there would
be no need for Congress to expressly provide for suits against facilities that pose an
“imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”288 The Sixth
Circuit incorrectly combined permit suits and endangerment suits into one single
276
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cause of action. A suit against a non-permitted facility is already provided for under
the first cause of action. Because Congress expressly provided for permit suits as a
separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), this should lead courts to
the interpretation that actions against permitted facilities are permitted under 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) as a separate and distinct cause of action. Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit‟s interpretation that endangerment suits cannot be brought against a
permitted facility is against the clear intent of Congress.
E. How Europe Would Have Handled the WTI Case
If WTI had been located within the EU, the outcome of the citizen suits would
probably have been different. The EU‟s adoption of the precautionary principle
would have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the facility, requiring the
facility to prove that it is safe rather than citizens being required to prove that the
facility is unsafe.289
Moreover, the EU has the ECJ in place to oversee legal battles that occur
between states. In the U.S., West Virginia was left to sue on behalf of its citizens in
the Ohio Supreme Court.290 In its suit before the Ohio Supreme Court, West
Virginia was challenging the site of the facility which was controlled by zoning. As
discussed above, zoning is under the purview of the state so zoning decisions must
be challenged in state court. It is far more likely that West Virginia would have
received an unbiased judicial opinion if it had been able to bring its case before a
completely impartial court of the sort embodied by the ECJ. 291 It seems to be asking
a great deal of the judges of any state to oversee impartially a dispute between their
own state and another.292 And, as a practical matter, the state judges overseeing
these disputes must second-guess the decisions of state, county, or local officials,
some of whom may have helped get them elected. Impartiality, and perhaps as
importantly, the appearance of impartiality, gives the EU an advantage over the U.S.
in settling disputes between states that cannot be removed to U.S. federal courts.
But it is the ECHR that has been willing to use the power of judicial
interpretation to protect the environment. In the RCRA statutes, the U.S. has on its
face an extremely environmentally friendly set of laws. 293 It is the interpretation of
RCRA by the U.S. Courts that have denied citizens the right to a safe and healthy
environment. Although the EU is arguably much more progressive in its protection
of the environment than the U.S., it continues to limit itself through the use of
directives rather than regulations to legislate environmental concerns. The ECHR, in
contrast, has put the right to a safe and healthy environment among the other human
rights the citizens of all Member States are entitled to.
Had the WTI plaintiffs been able to bring their case before the ECHR, there is a
real possibility they would have been successful. The WTI plaintiffs could have
brought the suit claiming the facility violated Article 8, the right to respect for home
289
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and private life, 294 because of the how close the facility sat to nearby residences. 295
The suit may also have been brought under Article 2, the right to life, because of the
health dangers WTI‟s releases of dioxin posed. 296 In the Giacomelli case discussed
above, the Italian authorities argued that it had not been proven that the facility was
dangerous.297 In much the same way, WTI argued that the USEPA had not proven
that their facility was dangerous.298 Again in Giacomelli, the ECHR ruled that
authorities must not wait for comprehensive data for each and every aspect of the
matter to act and found in favor of Giacomelli. 299 The ECHR generally rules for
plaintiffs in environmental suits only in cases that contain extreme facts, 300 but the
WTI case is extreme in its facts. Certainly the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found it was when Judge Alrich ruled the WTI facility posed an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the human health of the citizens of East
Liverpool.301 Therefore, if the WTI facility had been built in Europe, citizens faced
with a threat to their health and their environment would have had greater legal
remedies than citizens of the U.S. because of the presence of the ECHR.
F. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Although it may not be as established or as well-known as its European counterpart, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) rules on human rights
cases in the Americas. The IACHR is part of the Organization of American States
(OAS), which also includes an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.302
The United States was one of the 21 original members to ratify the Charter of the
OAS in 1948.303 The OAS now includes all the states of North America, Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean. 304 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IA Commission) is an autonomous organ of the OAS and is based in
Washington, D.C.305 Composed of seven independent human rights experts, the IA
294
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Commission has strived to promote the observance of human rights since 1959. 306
The IA Commission does not have any enforcement authority but rather it holds
hearings on petitions and then submits cases to the IACHR for enforcement.307 Like
the ECHR, the IA Commission requires the exhaustion of domestic remedies before
it will hear a case.308
Citizens may bring a case before the IACHR by submitting a petition against a
state to the IA Commission, either a general petition or a collective petition.309 A
general petition allows for citizens to bring cases where human rights violations are
widespread and not limited to one incident or one individual, while a collective
petition can be filed where there a numerous victims of a specific incidence or
specific practice.310 These petitions may be brought by either an individual victim or
by a third party, either with or without the victim‟s knowledge. 311 The IA
Commission will hear the case in two phases. 312 During the first phase, the IA
Commission determines whether the petition meets all procedural requirements and
whether jurisdiction is appropriate.313 If all requirements of the first phase are met,
the case moves on to the second phase where the case will be considered on the
merits.314 The IA Commission will consider evidence, hold hearings, and ultimately
determine state culpability.315 At this point the IA Commission may turn the case
over to the IACHR for enforcement, but only if the state involved is a party to the
American Convention on Human Rights and has submitted to the jurisdiction of the
IACHR.316
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights does not expressly recognize the
right to a healthy environment but, much like the ECHR, the IACHR has expressed a
willingness to expand other rights to cover environmental harms. 317 The Case of the
Saramaka Community v. Suriname was brought in 2007 alleging a human rights
violation caused by the environmental effects of a mining operation. 318 The plaintiff
lost on procedural grounds, and while the IACHR did not take the opportunity to
306
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address the issue of environmental human rights, it also did not deny the right to a
safe environment.319 Environmental issues have been raised in other factual settings,
such as when an environmental activist was murdered because of her activities, but
there has yet to be case on point deciding whether an environmental danger on its
own violates human rights.320
There is one U.S. case currently pending before the Commission concerning
environmental rights. The City of Mossville, Louisiana is a community founded in
the 1800‟s and consists almost entirely of African-American residents.321 The
community is “now surrounded by at least 14 industrial facilities, nine of which that
have admitted to polluting the environment.”322 The town‟s residents have three
times as much dioxin in their bodies as the general population. 323 At one point the
town had to be evacuated when there was an underground leak of a toxic chemical
from one of the plants. 324 The plaintiffs in the case allege they are the victims of
environmental racism.325 To get their case before the IA Commission, the plaintiffs
had to argue that there was no U.S. law that could provide them with an adequate
remedy to satisfy the requirement that all domestic remedies be exhausted.326 The
Commission has decided that it will hear the case, marking this as the first U.S.
environmental rights case the IA Commission has considered.327 To date there has
been no ruling on the merits. 328
Unfortunately for the Mossville plaintiffs, any decision made by the IA
Commission against the U.S. would not be enforceable. 329 Because the U.S. is a
319
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member of OAS, human rights cases can be brought before the IA Commission. 330
For the IACHR to enforce a ruling, the state must have acceded jurisdiction by
ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights. 331 The U.S. has not ratified
any Inter-American human rights treaty. 332 For U.S. plaintiffs, this means that the
IA Commission is the farthest their case can progress and the IACHR will not be
able to hear it.333 But because there has never been a case against the U.S. before, it
is not clear as a practical matter whether or not the U.S. would comply with a ruling
against it by the IA Commission. If nothing else, bringing a case before the IACHR
or the Commission can have a significant media impact and possibly bring national
attention to the plaintiffs‟ cause.334 If there is an increased public awareness of the
IA Commission and the IACHR within the U.S., the Inter-American Human Rights
system may become a powerful tool in influencing public policy.
G. WTI Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The residents of East Liverpool should consider bringing their case to the
attention of the Inter-American Human Rights System. East Liverpool and
Mossville share factual similarities which make it likely that the IA Commission
would accept the WTI case. The residents of East Liverpool are exposed to dioxin
released through incineration which then ends up in the bloodstreams of individuals,
while Mossville residents have blood dioxin levels three times higher than the rest of
the population.335 Both locations are rural areas inhabited primarily by poor, black
residents.336 And in both locations industrial facilities releasing dangerous pollutants
are located adjacent to residences. 337 The East Liverpool residents could argue,
330
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much like their counterparts in Mossville, that the domestic remedies available to
them in the U.S. were inadequate to protect their rights and could point to the flaws
in their previous RCRA endangerment suits discussed above to support this
argument. Additionally, WTI is located near the East End of East Liverpool, a
neighborhood made up almost exclusively of black residents. 338 With a properly
filed petition, East Liverpool citizens could bring a case against WTI for
environmental racism before the IA Commission for a ruling on the merits.
The IA Commission and the IACHR have been more and more willing to
consider cases involving human rights violations stemming from environmental
harms. In 2009, the IA Commission agreed to consider a case alleging an
environmental human rights violation stemming from Brazil‟s construction of
numerous dams.339 The construction of the large dams by the Brazilian government
harmed the environment and the indigenous people of the area who depended on the
water to sustain their way of life. 340 The IACHR has expanded the interpretations of
the American Convention on Human Rights to include environmental wrongs in
much the same way as the ECHR.341 Cases on environmental human rights are
heard by the IACHR under the right to life, property, equal protection, the
inviolability of the home, property, and due process. 342 Additionally, the IACHR is
very concerned with protecting the rights of individuals who rely on the land to
provide food and a livelihood.343 East Liverpool is located in the generally fertile
area in eastern Ohio and many of the people surrounding the city are farmers. 344
Pollution from dioxins, such as those released by WTI, become concentrated as they
move up the food chain, making food grown in the surrounding areas potentially
dangerous.345 East Liverpool is located in Columbiana County where nearly 40% of
the land is agricultural. 346 Because the IA Commission is sensitive to the needs of
those that rely on the land, such as indigenous peoples, 347 and because WTI poses a
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potential threat to an agricultural way of life by polluting the land, the IA
Commission may consider this in ruling in favor of the citizens of East Liverpool.
East Liverpool residents would have greater legal protections if the U.S. ratified
the American Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration). By ratifying the
Declaration, the U.S. would submit to the jurisdiction of the IACHR. 348 Currently,
U.S. cases cannot be brought before the IACHR and must stop at the IA
Commission.349 Decisions made by the IA Commission are not binding. If the
IACHR had jurisdiction within the U.S. its citizens could have human rights
violations legally enforced by an international body. Oversight by an international
body would provide U.S. citizens another level of legal protection that is not
currently available to them. With the Declaration as binding law within the U.S.,
U.S. citizens would have the same legal protections their European counterparts have
enjoyed under the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
IV. CONCLUSION
Endangerment suits provide an “„important set of checks and balances in the
enforcement process[,]‟ . . . „giv[ing] the outcome additional credibility, which is
particularly needed‟” given that government dishonesty can and sometimes does
occur.350 In the U.S., the legal remedies Congress intended to provide for
individuals faced with imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and
the environment under the RCRA statutes were denied to the plaintiffs in the WTI
cases. Additionally, the U.S. has fallen behind Europe and other international bodies
of law in the area of environmental protection and U.S. citizens do not have the same
legal remedies against environmental harms as EU citizens.351 The right to a clean
and healthy environment is also being incorporated into the fundamental human
rights embodied under both the ECHR and the IACHR. 352 The Fourth and Sixth
Circuits misinterpreted the RCRA statutes by failing to allow endangerment suits
against a permitted facility. A step in the right direction would be for Congress to
amend or replace this statute with a regulation that places higher restrictions on
activities, such as the incineration of hazardous waste, that pose a threat to human
health or the environment. In amending or replacing the RCRA citizen suit
provision, the focus should be on regulating the dangerous activity regardless of
whether a facility happens to hold a USEPA permit.
One way for the U.S. to place higher restrictions on dangerous activities and
align itself with the environmental norms of Europe and other international bodies
would be to adopt the precautionary approach to environmental regulation. 353 This
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principle would shift the burden to hazardous waste facilities to show that they do
not pose a threat to human health, as opposed to the current regime which places the
burden on plaintiffs to prove a facility poses a threat. 354 Because there is always a
degree of scientific uncertainty about the precise cause of any environmental or
health effect, the evidentiary and financial burden placed on plaintiffs bringing
environmental citizen suits to prove a facility is dangerous is often prohibitively
high. Another way for the U.S. to provide greater protection for its citizens from
environmental harm would be to ratify the American Declaration of Human Rights.
This would allow U.S. citizens to bring their case before the IACHR whose holdings
would then be enforceable within the U.S.355 These actions would provide U.S.
citizens with greater legal remedies against environmental harms which are currently
limited by courts‟ narrow interpretations of the RCRA endangerment action. By
adopting the precautionary principle and the ratifying the IACHR, the citizens of the
U.S. would be afforded the same environmental protections as the citizens of the EU.
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